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The Aparri Operation – The AIF plan for the invasion of Luzon 1944-1945 
 
During 1943 Australian forces made their most significant contribution to the war in 
the Pacific. The ‘Reconquest’ operations in New Guinea were the largest ever 
Australian military operations. Some twenty-five Australian infantry battalions 
participated in these operations, the most to see action simultaneously since the battle 
in the Somme Valley in 1918, and they were provided with  naval, logistic and air 
support that was immensely greater than anything provided to Australians during the 
First World War.  
 
Following these highly successful operations US forces in the South West Pacific 
Area (SWPA) took over major operations against the Japanese, while the Australian 
forces were either used to garrison New Guinea and the surrounding islands or 
withdraw to rest and retain for further operations. As the battlelines in the SWPA 
moved closer to the Philippines the Australian government provided General Douglas 
MacArthur with the I Australian Corps to use in his offensive. MacArthur’s initial 
planning for the invasion of the main Philippine island of Luzon called for this corps 
to play a critical role in the campaign through a landing at Aparri to establish an 
airfield and to drive on the central highlands on the island. Despite the initial planning 
in which this operation was to play a vital role in the overall the reconquest of Luzon, 
it was never carried out.   
 
Instead of being involved in the major offensive in the Philippines campaign the I 
Australian Corps was shunted off to invade the strategically insignificant region of 
Borneo in operations that would have no bearing on the outcome of the war. The 
landing at Aparri represented the only significant opportunity for Australian troops to 
once again be at the forefront of operations in the Pacific.  
 
This paper will assess the viability of the Aparri operation and detail the complicated 
strategic and political reasons why it was not carried out. It will argue that this 
operation would have made a major contribution to the Allied victory in the 
Philippines and that while the reasons for its cancellation may have been valid in the 
eyes of MacArthur’s planning staff they represented a major failing in intelligence 
operations in the SWPA. 
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